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I.

Introduction
Is the letter of the rule against perpetuities (the Rule) more important than its

public policy? The Appellants in this case recklessly petition the Court to apply the Rule
to a commonly used form of mineral reservation for the first time in the reservation’s
nearly 100 years of use. They contend the Rule should apply even though it would cloud
or nullify the property interests of countless unrepresented parties, spur a spate of
litigation, remove a useful form of mineral ownership from commerce, and disrupt oil
and gas development across Kansas—all in contravention of the Rule’s policy of making
land more likely to be developed. Kansas courts have long rejected applying the Rule at
the expense of its policy. This case does not provide a compelling reason to change
course.
The Kansas Independent Oil and Gas Association (KIOGA) represents the
interests of over 1,400 members involved in the development of crude oil and natural gas
in Kansas. KIOGA’s members, who include oil and gas producers, attorneys, landmen,
and abstractors, have long assumed reservations of defeasible term mineral interests, like
those in the present case, are valid under the Rule because they promote the development
of oil and gas and create a future interest that parties in commerce regard as immediately
vested. For as long as these reservations have existed, parties in Kansas have purchased
leases, paid royalties, and probated estates on this assumption.
KIOGA urges the Court not to apply the Rule and upend this long-accepted
practice. In this brief, KIOGA will describe the commonness of the interests at stake,
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illustrate some of the practical consequences of applying the Rule to them, and
demonstrate the commercial function these interests serve in the development of oil and
gas.
II.

This is not a typical rule against perpetuities case because the form of
property conveyance involved has been widely used in Kansas for nearly a
century.
The cases Appellants cite in support of applying the Rule involve unusual, even

one-of-a-kind, conveyances that affected a discrete number of parties. Beverlin v. First
Nat’l Bank, 151 Kan. 307, 98 P.2d 200 (1940), examined a complicated devise involving
multiple generations of a single family. Similarly, In re Estate of Freeman, 195 Kan. 190,
404 P.2d 404 (1965), involved alternative devises of the corpus of a unique testamentary
trust. Yet another will construction case, Nelson v. Kring, 225 Kan. 499, 592 P.2d 438
(1979), considered the relatively rare case of a charitable devise of land for use as a
hospital.
Here, in contrast, the form of conveyance before the Court is pervasive in titles to
land in Kansas. The frequent occurrence of reserved defeasible term mineral interests is
illustrated partly by the number of reported Kansas appellate decisions construing them.1
E.g., Brooks v. Mull, 147 Kan. 740, 78 P.2d 879 (1938); Zaskey v. Farrow, 159 Kan. 347,
154 P.2d 1013 (1945); Shepard v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 Kan. 125, 368
P.2d 19 (1962); Dewell v. Fed. Land Bank, 191 Kan. 258, 380 P.2d 379 (1963); Stratmann

1

The earliest example of a defeasible term mineral interest reservation in the Kansas
cases appears to be from March 1929. See Brooks v. Mull, 147 Kan. 740, 78 P.2d 879
(1938).
2

v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658, 465 P.2d 938 (1970); Classen v. Fed. Land Bank of Wichita,
228 Kan. 426, 617 P.2d 1255 (1980); Friesen v. Fed. Land Bank, 227 Kan. 522, 608 P.2d
915 (1980); Kneller v. Fed. Land Bank, 247 Kan. 399, 799 P.2d 485 (1990); Oxy USA,
Inc. v. Red Wing Oil, LLC, 51 Kan. App. 2d 1028, 360 P.3d 457 (2015), pet. for rev.
granted (Kan. Sept. 29, 2017). Kansas is not unique; these interests are also prevalent in
other oil and gas producing states. See 1 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and
Gas § 17.3 at 524 n.21 (1987) (collecting cases); 2 Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M.
Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 335 at 186.2(1)–(2) n.8 (Matthew
Bender 2017) (same).
To illustrate the ubiquity of these reservations in Kansas, KIOGA conducted a
limited examination of conveyances made during a five-year period by the Federal Land
Bank of Wichita and Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation (the Banks), which routinely
reserved term mineral interests when conveying foreclosed lands. KIOGA identified 114
deeds containing such reservations, covering 25,416 gross acres in four Kansas counties.2
As the cases above illustrate, the Banks are far from the only grantors to make these
reservations; individual grantors have also widely adopted the practice. KIOGA’s
findings are summarized in Appendix A.
In determining mineral ownership under these conveyances, lawyers and parties in
commerce have always accepted the term reservations and the future interests that follow
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Counsel for KIOGA conducted a grantor–grantee search for conveyances in which the
Federal Land Bank of Wichita or the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation was the grantor
in Franklin, Greenwood, Russell, and Trego counties from January 1, 1940, to December
31, 1945.
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as valid. Passing title on these conveyances is justified by the dearth of authorities
questioning them. As the above cases demonstrate, Kansas appellate courts have upheld
the validity of these interests many times without discussion of the Rule. The Kansas
Title Standards Handbook addresses these interests without noting the Rule. Standards
for Title Examination Comm., Kan. Bar Ass’n, Kan. Title Standards Handbook § 16.3
(8th ed. 2018). The fact that no one has previously challenged this prevalent form of
conveyance under the Rule in Kansas further confirms the practice.
As Professor Eugene Kuntz notes, the application of the Rule to the interest
following a retained term mineral interest “is easily overlooked, probably because the
evil designed to be avoided by the rule is not readily apparent if it is apparent at all.”
Kuntz, supra, § 17.3 at 524. The parties to these conveyances regard the grantee’s interest
as certain to one day become possessory, putting them beyond the spirit, if not also the
letter, of the Rule. See Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 632 (Wyo. 1983).
Additionally, the application of the Rule to the executory interest following a
determinable fee in minerals has been raised before appellate courts of other oil and gas
producing states. Of those other states, none have ultimately applied the Rule to void the
future interest. E.g., ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, Number 13-14-00402-CV, 2016
Tex. App. LEXIS 5278 (Tex. App. May 19, 2016), pet. for rev. granted, 2017 Tex. LEXIS
562 (Tex. Jun. 16, 2017); Stevens Mineral Co. v. State, 418 N.W.2d 130 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987); Earle v. Int’l Paper Co. 429 So.2d 989 (Ala. 1983); Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620
(Wyo. 1983); Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App. 1981); Rousselot v.
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Spanier, 131 Cal. Rptr. 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil
Co., 270 P.2d 604, 611–12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954)).
For these reasons, untold numbers of oil and gas leases have been purchased,
drilled, and produced on the understanding that this form of conveyance is effective.
Lawyers have certified countless titles on this understanding. Reversing this assumption
after almost 100 years would cause widespread title confusion, spur litigation, and expose
thousands of parties to unforeseen and potentially devastating liabilities. Accordingly, in
determining whether to apply the Rule in this case, the Court should weigh the public
policy benefits of its application—which do not exist—against the public policy losses of
upsetting certainty of land titles across the state.
III.

Applying the Rule to void the grantee’s interest would betray Kansas’s public
policy of upholding certainty in land titles.
The rationale behind the Rule is not the only public policy at stake in this case.

Kansas also has a public policy of upholding certainty in titles to land. Holdings that
would tend to make land titles uncertain are “contrary to the public policy in this state.”
Schultz v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 149 Kan. 148, 152, 86 P.2d 533 (1939). Preserving current
understandings of title from doubt “is of great importance to the public.” Harvest Queen
Mill & Elevator Co. v. Sanders, 189 Kan. 536, 543, 370 P.2d 419 (1962). On the basis of
this public policy, this Court has declined to retroactively adopt new applications of legal
rules that would force a reexamination of titles and subject parties in commerce to
unforeseen liability. See Giles v. Adobe Royalty, Inc., 235 Kan. 758, 766–67, 684 P.2d 406
(1984).
5

Kneller v. Fed. Land Bank, 247 Kan. 399, 799 P.2d 485 (1990), illustrates when it
is inappropriate to retroactively apply a modification of existing law. Kneller involved a
division order title opinion issued under the Court’s rule in Smith v. Home Royalty Assoc.,
209 Kan. 609, 498 P.2d 98 (1972), which held that production from lands with which a
tract is pooled or unitized does not perpetuate a term mineral interest in the tract. Eight
years later, the Court reversed this rule in Classen v. Fed. Land Bank, 228 Kan. 426, 617
P.2d 1255 (1980). Appellants asked the Kneller court to apply Classen retroactively and
render the division order title opinion issued under Smith erroneous. The Kneller court
prudently declined, reasoning that applying the modification retroactively “would make a
phoenix out of a defeasible or mineral interest [sic] which had, under the existing Kansas
law, expired eight years prior to the filing of Classen.” Kneller, 247 Kan. at 404.
Such is the case here, where a holding that applies the Rule would not only
resurrect expired term mineral interest reservations, but enlarge them to a full fee simple
absolute. Title opinions issued by virtually every lawyer and law firm in the state
practicing in the area would be rendered erroneous. To demonstrate only a few of the
potential consequences of such a holding, consider the following hypothetical scenarios.
HYPOTHETICAL 1: THERE WILL BE BLOOD3
Fact 1:

On December 1, 1985, Paul executed a deed in favor of Eli conveying the
Sunday Tract. The deed contained a reservation materially identical to the
reservations in this case, i.e., saving and excepting all oil, gas, and other
minerals for a period of 20 years and as long thereafter as oil, gas and/or
other minerals are produced.

3

There Will be Blood (Paramount Vantage, Miramax, and Ghoulardi Film Company 2007)
(motion picture) (providing an entertaining, fictional look at the oil and gas industry).
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Fact 2:

On December 1, 2005, there was no production of oil, gas and/or other
minerals on or from the Sunday Tract and no drilling had ever occurred on
the land.

Fact 3:

On December 1, 2006, Plainview Oil Co. obtained an oil and gas lease from
Eli covering the Sunday Tract. Plainview Oil Co. did not obtain an oil and
gas lease from Paul because it believed his interest in the Sunday Tract
terminated and devolved to Eli under the deed’s express terms.

Fact 4:

Prior to drilling, Plainview Oil Co. obtained a title opinion from
Reasonable Law Firm. Reasonable Law Firm certified title to the minerals
in the Sunday Tract in Eli.

Fact 5:

Plainview Oil Co. then drilled on the Sunday Tract and hit a gusher.

Hypothetical 1 potentially exists in droves across Kansas. If the Court were to
apply the Rule in this case, Paul or his successors in interest would have a claim against
Plainview Oil Co. for mineral trespass and conversion. Plainview Oil Co. may have a
claim against Eli for reimbursement of wrongly paid royalties. Plainview Oil Co. may
also have a claim for legal malpractice against Reasonable Law Firm for its title
certification.
Similar claims would abound statewide and potentially overburden district courts.
Registers of deeds offices would be inundated by landmen and title examiners attempting
to find fact situations like the above and then acquire leases of the grantors’ interest (or
bring a claim for mineral trespass and conversion). Cognizant of the potential for
mispaying royalties, oil and gas producers would likely suspend payment on many or
most leases until title could be reexamined.
The costs of reexamining title, obtaining curative oil and gas leases, and defending
claims of mineral trespass and conversion brought by unleased mineral owners would
7

likely fall on oil and gas producers. But the ultimate responsibility for wrongly paid
royalties would likely fall on the original recipients—those mineral owners who claimed
title to a future interest following the grantor’s reservation. These persons would be left
without any mineral interest and potentially liable for repayment of royalties. See
Waechter v. Amoco Prod. Co., 217 Kan. 489, 515–16, 537 P.2d 228 (1975) (permitting
lessee to recover wrongly paid royalty payments from payees).
Although it is impossible to precisely estimate, the potential aggregate monetary
impact of the title uncertainty depicted in this hypothetical is huge. Appendix B
approximates the total proceeds from the sale of oil and gas produced in Kansas from
2012–2016. As can be seen on Appendix B, if even 1% of oil and gas production would
be affected (a conservative estimate), as much as $216.8 Million in proceeds could be at
stake. If 5% of production would be affected, the amount may exceed $1 Billion.
HYPOTHETICAL 2: THE BEVERLY HILLBILLIES4
Fact 1:

On December 1, 1985, Jed executed a deed in favor of Granny conveying
the Clampett Place. The deed contained a reservation materially identical to
the reservations in this case, i.e., saving and excepting all oil, gas and other
minerals for a period of 20 years and as long thereafter as oil, gas and/or
other minerals are produced.

Fact 2:

On December 1, 2005, there was no production of oil, gas and/or other
minerals on or from the Clampett Place and no drilling had ever occurred
on the land.

Fact 3:

On December 1, 2006, Jed died testate leaving all of his property to Jethro.
Reasonable Law Firm prepared the inventory for Jed’s estate and did not
show him owning an interest in the Clampett Place.

4

The Beverly Hillbillies (Filmways Television and McCadden Productions 1962–1971)
(television series) (depicting the fictional Clampett family whose chance discovery of oil
on their rural homeplace led them to a tony neighborhood of Beverly Hills).
8

Fact 4:

On December 2, 2006, Granny died testate leaving all of her property to
Elly May. Rational Law Firm prepared the inventory for Granny’s estate
and showed her owning the Clampett Place, including ownership of all oil,
gas and other minerals.

Hypothetical 2 could be more ubiquitous than hypothetical 1 because it would
arise even in the absence of oil or gas production. If the Court were to apply the Rule in
this case, the inventories in both hypothetical estates would be rendered incorrect, and
title to the minerals in the Clampett Place would immediately become unmarketable.
Jethro and Elly May would likely litigate their adverse claims to the minerals, or, at a
minimum, reopen both estates to amend the inventories and journal entries of final
settlement. This scenario, like the first, would be reproduced across Kansas.
Other ripple effects may be less obvious. If, for instance, Elly May ever conveyed
and warranted her interest in the minerals to a third party after purportedly taking title
from Granny’s estate, she may be liable to her grantees for breach of warranty. Since
Jethro never believed he owned an interest in the minerals, it is unlikely he or his
successors in interest cared to maintain a chain of title to the interest, which could
increase the legal costs of development. Elly May might have wrongly paid county
property taxes on the severed mineral interest and, if the interest had ever produced oil or
gas, state mineral severance tax on royalties received. The potential claims that could
arise from this or the first hypothetical are limited only by the collective imagination of
our state’s bar.
These hypothetical scenarios are far from the only foreseeable disruptions that
would result from nullifying the grantee’s interest under the Rule. To apply the Rule in
9

this case, the Court must be willing to sacrifice the state’s public policy of maintaining
certainty in land titles. But is applying the Rule worth it? No. On the contrary, there are
no policy gains whatsoever to be achieved by invalidating the grantee’s interest. These
interests serve an important social and commercial function by fostering oil and gas
extraction. To strike them down in the name of the Rule would be counterproductive to
the Rule’s own policy.
IV.

Invalidating future interests following retained term mineral interests is not
justified by the purpose and public policy of the Rule and therefore is not
required under the Rule.
Briefly, the Rule “precludes the creation of any future interest in the property

which does not necessarily vest within twenty-one years after a life or lives presently in
being.” Gore v. Beren, 254 Kan. 418, 428, 867 P.2d 330 (1994). The Rule “springs from”
considerations of public policy. This Court has articulated the Rule’s policy as follows:
The underlying reason for and purpose of the rule is to avoid fettering real
property with future interests dependent upon contingencies unduly remote
which isolate the property and exclude it from commerce and development
for long periods of time, thus working an indirect restraint upon alienation,
which is regarded at common law as a public evil.
First Nat’l Bank v. Sidwell, 234 Kan. 867, Syl. ¶ 8, 678 P.2d 118 (1984). The Rule,
though concerned solely with the remoteness of vesting of future interests, ultimately
serves the “fundamental purpose of keeping property freely alienable.” Id. at 875.
But, in modern times, the Rule “is not a favorite of the courts.” Drach v. Ely, 237
Kan. 654, 657, 703 P.2d 746 (1985). Courts today avoid a strict, slavish application of the
Rule and instead attempt to “temper the rule where its rigid application would do
10

violence to an intended scheme for the disposition of property.” Id. at 656; e.g., Rucker v.
Delay, 295 Kan. 826, 831, 289 P.3d 1166 (2012) (adopting the Restatement (Third) of
Property’s approach to categorizing all future interests as either reversions or
remainders). In the present case, a rigid application of the Rule would do violence not to
one intended scheme for the disposition of property, but to thousands made across the
state over the last century.
A.

The policy from which the Rule springs does not support invalidating the
form of conveyance at issue here.

The evil the Rule was designed to avoid is not apparent in interests following
retained term mineral interests. Kuntz, supra, § 17.3 at 524. “In most cases the very
existence of a future interest tends indirectly to fetter the alienability of the property
which it affects,” because the property is not marketable unless an absolute interest is
offered for sale. Lewis M. Simes, The Law of Future Interests § 108 at 362 (1951). At
least when the property involved includes the surface estate, it is often necessary to unite
the present and future interests to develop or sell the property. For example, in
hypothetical 2 Elly May would be unlikely to construct improvements on the surface of
the Clampett Place if her surface interest were subject to an executory interest that might
defease her of the interest and the benefit of her improvements. Third parties would also
be unlikely to purchase her interest for the same reason without also obtaining the
executory interest.
This is not so where the property involved is only a mineral estate. As Williams &
Meyers observes,
11

Full utilization of oil and gas in place depends upon exploration for and
production of the minerals. Almost invariably this development is secured
by the execution of an oil and gas lease. Thus, so long as there is no
interference with the power to lease, there is, for practical purposes, no
interference with alienability of the mineral estate. In short, when
“alienability” is used in connection with property interests in oil and gas, it
means the power to lease.
Williams & Meyers, supra, § 325 at 71. A mineral estate remains “alienable” even if
subject to an executory limitation like the cessation of production because it can be
developed or leased as though it were a fee simple absolute. And because it can be
developed or leased, such an interest is marketable even though an absolute interest is not
offered for sale. This is borne out by the experience of KIOGA’s members, who routinely
lease and develop mineral estates subject to executory interests, and the Kansas cases
involving these interests, which often arise from issues surrounding oil and gas
production.
Far from reducing the marketability and commercial use of the property, a
defeasible term mineral interest actually increases the probability of the property’s
development. It incentivizes the possessory owner to lease or develop the minerals to
extend the duration of the present estate. Transforming the possessory owner’s interest
into a fee simple absolute removes the incentive to timely develop and defeats the
principal aim of the Rule—to make property more marketable and valuable to the present
owner. Further, if defeasible term mineral reservations were struck down, many parties
would likely resort instead to reserving a fractional undivided mineral interest in fee
simple absolute. This would fractionalize ownership of the minerals and make
development more difficult. See, e.g., Holland v. Shaffer, 162 Kan. 474, 476, 178 P.2d
12

235 (1947) (involving a mineral partition brought to unite minerals so fractionalized no
company would develop them).
The Rule is designed to forward the circulation of property in commerce. It would
be a travesty—in the name of the Rule—to do the opposite by invalidating reservations of
defeasible term mineral interests. See generally Williams & Meyers, supra, § 326 at 76–
77.
Moreover, even though the Appellees’ future interest in this case is an executory
interest, it was certain to vest (i.e., become possessory at some future time) at the moment
of its creation. It is possible to create an executory interest to take effect on an event
certain to occur. Simes, supra, § 110 at 377. Parties to term mineral reservations
universally understand that production of minerals from any given tract of land will
eventually cease. The only unknown is the time of cessation. Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d
620, 632 (Wyo. 1983). A future interest following such a reservation is not contingent,
can be readily valued and marketed, and is properly exempt from the Rule. See Simes,
supra, § 110 at 377.
B.

Where application of the Rule would not accomplish its goals of fostering
free alienability and development of land in commerce, it does not apply.

Even Professor John Chipman Gray, who advocated for a far-reaching application
of the Rule, recognized that the Rule does not apply where its policy does not support it.
Williams & Meyers, supra, § 325 at 70 n.22 (citing John Chipman Gray, The Rule
Against Perpetuities § 603.1). The authors of Williams & Meyers believe courts should
simply exempt the grantee’s future interest from the Rule “on the straight-forward basis
13

that they serve social and commercial convenience and do not offend the policy of the
Rule Against Perpetuities.” Id. § 335 at 187. Professor Hemingway offers a concurring
solution in which courts would exempt such interests from the Rule as sui generis.
Richard W. Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas § 109 n.259 (3d ed. 1991).
A similar approach is proposed by Professor David Pierce, writing for amicus
curiae EKOGA, whereby the Court would conduct a tripartite public policy analysis
focusing on the interests of the parties to the conveyance, the public policies surrounding
the Rule, and the impact on the Kansas real property system of applying it. Br. of Amicus
Curiae EKOGA 10–11, Jan. 9, 2017. This framework recognizes the Rule as a creature of
public policy and provides a principled means of applying it to modern-day transactions.
There is precedent in Kansas for not applying the Rule where it would not serve to
foster alienability and development. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Sidwell Corp.,
234 Kan. 867, 876, 678 P.2d 118 (1984) (electing not to apply the Rule to rights it
characterized as “purely contractual”); Howell v. Coop. Refinery Ass’n, 176 Kan. 572,
578, 271 P.2d 271, 276 (1954) (finding the future interest owner’s overriding royalty
rights to be “vested” and thus not subject to the Rule); Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum,
Co., 173 Kan. 183, 187, 245 P.2d 176 (1952) (characterizing the lease interests at issue as
“vested” and outside of the Rule). Perhaps the clearest example of this policy is found in
Singer Co. v. Makad, Inc., 213 Kan. 725, 729–33, 518 P.2d 493 (1973). In that case, the
Court declined to apply the Rule to a common species of commercial lease where it
would needlessly burden parties to an accepted form of commercial transaction. Singer
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Co. recognizes that the Rule is servient to its policy and should not be applied to
contravene it.
V.

Conclusion
Applying the Rule in this case would violate the public policy in favor of

maintaining certainty in land titles. It would further violate the policy reason for the Rule,
both by instantaneously clogging the marketability of countless acres of land and by
removing from commerce a useful form of mineral ownership. Modern Kansas courts
have eschewed slavish devotion to the letter of the Rule in favor of a more reasoned,
policy-oriented approach. This Court should as well.
The Court has many alternatives to applying the Rule at it its disposal. The best
approach is to adopt a public-policy based analysis and exempt interests following
reserved defeasible term mineral interests from the Rule on the straightforward basis that
they serve social and commercial convenience and do not offend the policy of the Rule.
Respectfully submitted,
DEPEW GILLEN RATHBUN & McINTEER, LC
/s/ Joseph A. Schremmer
Joseph A. Schremmer, #25968
Charles C. Steincamp, #16086
Counsel for KIOGA
JOHNSTON EISENHAUER EISENHAUER &
LYNCH, LLC
/s/ Tyson Eisenhauer
Tyson Eisenhauer, #25424
113 E. Third Street—P.O. Box 825
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Appendix A – Federal Land Bank of Wichita and Federal Farm Mortgage Deeds Containing Mineral Reservations:
January 1, 1940 to December 31, 19455

County

Total Deeds
Containing
Reservation

Gross Acres
Covered by Deeds

Net Mineral Acres
Reserved by Deeds

Franklin

46

6,880

1,840

Greenwood

25

5,101

1,305

Russell

19

4,518

1,130

Trego

24

8,917

2,229

Total

114

25,416

6,504

5

The reservation language used in each deed was in substantially the same format as the following: “Excepting and
reserving unto party of the first part, its successors and assigns, an undivided ________ of all oil, gas and other minerals and
mineral rights, in, upon and under the above described real estate for a period of ______ years from and after the
______________, and so long thereafter as oil, gas and/or other minerals or any of them are produced therefrom, or the
premises are being developed or operated.”
i

Appendix B – Estimated Oil and Gas Proceeds at Risk From Rule Against Perpetuities Claims: 2012 to 2016

Total Oil
Year Production6

Average
WTI Price7

Estimated % of Total Oil Proceeds Affected by Rule Against
Perpetuities Claims
1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

2012

43,750,558

$94.05

$41,147,400

$82,294,800 $123,442,199 $164,589,599 $205,736,999

2013

46,845,544

$97.98

$45,899,264

$91,798,528 $137,697,792 $183,597,056 $229,496,320

2014

49,504,847

$93.25

$46,163,270

$92,326,540 $138,489,809 $184,653,079 $230,816,349

2015

45,467,562

$48.66

$22,124,516

$44,249,031

$66,373,547

2016

37,938,634

$43.15

$16,370,521

$32,741,041

$49,111562

Total 223,507,145

$88,498,063 $110,622,578
$65,482,082

$81,852603

$171,704,970 $343,409,940 $515,114,910 $686,819,880 $858,524,849

6

KAN. GEO. SURVEY, State Production and Historical Info, http://www.kgs.ku.edu/PRS/petro/state.html (last visited Jan. 12,
2018).
7
STATISTA, Average Annual West Texas Intermediate (WTI) Crude Oil Price from 1976 to 2017 (In U.S. Dollars Per Barrel),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266659/west-texas-intermediate-oil-prices/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
ii

Appendix B – Continued

Year

Total Gas
Production8

Average HH
Price9

Estimated % of Total Gas Proceeds Affected by Rule Against
Perpetuities Claims
1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

2012

299,051,000

$2.76

$8,253,808

$16,507,615

$24,761,423

$33,015,230

$41,269,038

2013

293,437,001

$3.71 $10,886,513

$21,773,025

$32,659,538

$43,546,051

$54,432,564

2014

288,090,066

$4.35 $12,531,918

$25,063,836

$37,595,754

$50,127,671

$62,659,589

2015

285,773,485

$2.60

$7,430,111

$14,860,221

$22,290,332

$29,720,442

$37,150,553

2016

245,572,714

$2.46

$6,041,089

$12,082,178

$18,123,266

$24,164,355

$30,205,444

Total 1,411,924,266

$45,143,438

$90,286,875 $135,430,313 $180,573,750 $225,717,188

8

KAN. GEO. SURVEY, State Production and Historical Info, http://www.kgs.ku.edu/PRS/petro/state.html (last visited Jan. 12,
2018).
9
STATISTA, Average U.S. Henry Hub (HH) Natural Gas Price from 2003 to 2016 (In U.S. Dollars Per Million British
Thermal Units), https://www.statista.com/statistics/383557/us-henry-hub-average-natural-gas-price/ (last visited Jan. 12,
2018).
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